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Lawrence: Surrogacy in California

SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA:
GENETIC AND GESTATIONAL
RIGHTS
Dale Elizabeth Lawrence*

INTRODUCTION
Since it began over a decade ago, surrogacy 1 has become a
viable alternative means of reproduction and is utilized by an
increasing number of infertile couples. 2 However, the debate
over the legality and enforceability of surrogate parenting agreements continues unabated in the courts and state legislatures. 3
As of this publication, the California State Legislature- has not
enacted any pertinent legislation, thus leaving resolution of surrogacy disputes to the judiciary. An advisory panel' was ap• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992; B.A., University of California, Berkeley.
1. This term is used to describe a surrogate parenting agreement whereby a woman
agrees to bear the child of a man not her husband, generally through artificial insemination, and to relinquish all parental rights upon the birth of the child to the man and his
wife. M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 6 (1988) [hereinafter FIELD). The surrogate
mother may be genetically related to the child by providing the ovum herself (traditional
surrogacy) or she may serve only as the gestational mother, the embryo having been
produced through in vitro fertilization of the couple's egg and sperm and subsequently
implanted in the gestational mother (gestational surrogacy).
2. The Center for Surrogate Parenting in Los Angeles, California, estimates there
have been approximately 250 surrogate births in California since 1978 involving all professional surrogacy programs, and an additional 250 surrogate births have occurred in
California privately without the aid of a professional program. Additionally, this Center
estimates that approximately 2,000 surrogate births have occurred nationwide utilizing
professional programs since approximately 1975 and another 2,000 have resulted nationwide privately. MINORITY REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE
COMM. ON SURROGATE PARENTING, at M7-M8 (July 1990) [hereinafter MINORITY REPORT).
3. For the legislative years 1987 through 1989, legislative initiatives concerning surrogacy were introduced in 39 states and the District of Columbia. 15 STATE LEGIS. REP.
OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, No.2, at 1 (Jan. 1990) [hereinafter STATE
LEGIS. REP.).
4. The advisory panel was composed of predominantly legal and medical experts, as
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pointed to provide recommendations on surrogate parenting to
assist the Joint Committee on Surrogate Parenting in report'ing
to the California State Legislature. 1I As a result of the Final Report of the Advisory Panel to the Joint Legislative Committee
on Surrogate Parenting, surrogacy bills are being introduced
during the 1991-1992 legislative year. 8
Surrogacy presents legal, ethical and social issues that must
be resolved legislatively in order to provide the judiciary and citizens with guidelines. Such issues include the legality and enforceability of surrogate parenting agreements; the scope of reproductive choice constitutionally; ethical concerns regarding
the potential for exploitation; the social benefits and harms created by the practice of surrogacy; parental status and rights of
the parties; and state versus federal legislation.
Part I of this article contrasts the surrogacy controversy in
California with the legislative response nationwide by examining
the various underlying issues that must necessarily be considered by state legislatures. 7 Although the surrogacy controversy
raises issues that concern the nation and society as a whole, it
should be resolved independently by each state's legislature. At
the center of the debate lies the question of whether the practice
of surrogacy is detrimental or beneficial to the contracting parties and to society.
Part II examines a California judicial decision 8 of first impression and compares it to other states' judicial decisions on
surrogacy.9 The California decision is indicative of the need for
legislation in the state, as its results were not reached through
an application of current laws. tO Furthermore, the decision and
several legislative proposals reflect the conflict on surrogacy
within the state. While its holding is supported by recently inwell as a clinical licensed social worker and a professor of philosophy. FINAL REPORT-OF
THE ADVISORY PANEL TO THE JOINT LEGIS. COMM. ON SURROGATE PARENTING, at 32-37
(July 1990) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT).
5. Id. at 2.
6. L.A. Daily Journal, July 18, 1990, at 5, col. 2. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing recently introduced legislation in California).
7. See infra notes 25-82 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 135-206 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.
lO. See infra note 19.
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troduced legislation,ll it is directly at odds with the recommended legislation of the Advisory Panel's Final Report to the
Joint Legislative Committee on Surrogate Parenting. 12 Legislation will serve to clarify the rights of parties to a surrogate
parenting agreement.
Ultimately the surrogacy issue is one of public policy. As of
this publication, Congress has not enacted any national legislation concerning surrogate parenting agreements, but has instead
left resolution of the myriad of issues to individual state courts
and legislatures. As a paramount public policy issue, resolution
of the surrogacy controversy should be achieved through the enactment of state legislation. This Article concludes that such legislation should regulate surrogate parenting agreements rather
than completely prohibit these arrangements. It is in the best
interests of California and all parties involved to provide legislative regulatory guidelines as a response to the increasing practice
of surrogacy. By permitting individuals to enter into surrogate
parenting agreements, establishing presumptions of the legal relationships and providing for professional and court supervision,
regulatory guidelines would protect individual Constitutional
rights while minimizing the risk of exploitation.
BACKGROUND
A significant majority of the surrogacy cases in the courts
thus far have involved what is termed "traditional surrogacy,"13
in which a "surrogate mother" agrees to be artificially inseminated with the sperm of a man whose wife is infertile. 14 The
agreement provides that she is to carry the child to term and
upon giving birth will relinquish all her parental rights, thus allowing the biological father's wife to adopt the child. 11i However,
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.

In actuality, "surrogate mother" is a misnomer in traditional surrogacy, as the
woman so termed is the genetic mother. However, this term has consistently been used
to denote the woman who agrees to bear a child for a man not her husband, whether she
is the genetic mother or the gestational mother. In this article, "surrogate mother" will
be used when referring to a woman who serves as a surrogate in traditional surrogacy
and is therefore also the genetic mother.
15. FIELD, supra note I, at 6.
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"gestational 'surrogacy"16 has now become an alternative means
of reproduction for infertile couples. In this process, the egg is
fertilized in vitro 17 and later implanted in a surrogate who becomes the gestational mother.ls She is therefore not genetically
related to the fetus and intends to relinquish the child at birth
to the couple. With gestational surrogacy, the question becomes
who is the mother? Is it the gestational mother or the woman
who provided the egg? These questions do not have clear legislative answers in California. Currently California state law provides that the natural mother is the one who has given birth to
the child. 19 Due to the potential for a variety of roles of parties
in a surrogacy arrangement,20 legislation must be enacted to encompass each possibility. Until each state or the federal government has enacted legislation dealing with surrogacy specifically,
parties to a surrogate parenting agreement cannot be sure of
their respective rights should a dispute arise.
I.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY

Recent reports 21 conducted and legislation introduced in
California22 and in other states 23 indicate that the public policy
16. In a "gestational surrogacy" arrangement, the surrogate is not genetically related
to the child. In this article, "gestational mother" will be used when referring to a woman
who is not genetically related to the fetus but has agreed to carry the infertile couple's
embryo to term.
17. In vitro fertilization usually refers to the process whereby a doctor stimulates
the development of eggs through the use of hormones, removes the eggs in a procedure
called laparoscopy, and fertilizes them in a petri dish prior to implantation. T. SHANNON,
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE ETHICS OF USING HUMAN BEINGS 4-5 (1988) [hereinafter
SHANNON].
18. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7003(1) (West 1983). The statute provides that "the natural
mother ... may be established by proof of her having given birth to the child . . . . "
20. A child may have numerous parents: There is the potential for a genetic mother,
gestational mother, rearing mother, genetic father and rearing father. SHANNON, supra
note 17, at 79-80.
21. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3. This report reviews surrogate parenting contract legislation enacted during the 1987, 1988 and 1989 legislative sessions; FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 19-31 sets forth the advisory panel's recommendations for legislation in California.
22. See infra note 24 (review of legislation introduced in California over the last ten
years).
23. See STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 7-10 (A summary of state bill introductions on surrogate parenting contracts. This report indicates that for the 1987-1989 legislative sessions there were a total of 205 bills introduced to prohibit, regulate or study
surrogacy).
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issues surrounding surrogacy are being examined throughout the
country.

A.

SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA

Surrogacy legislation has been introduced in California periodically over the past decade. 24 These bills ranged from regulation of the practice to express prohibition of commercial
su!rogacy.
The California Legislature analyzed the issues surrounding
the surrogacy debate through the establishment of an advisory
pane1. 211 This panel submitted its Final Report to the Joint Legislative Committee on Surrogate Parenting 26 in July 1990. 27 The
State Legislature will examine surrogacy legislation based upon
bills introduced by the Joint Committee's members.28 In its re24. A.B. 365 and A.B. 3771 were introduced in 1981-82 by Los Angeles Democrat
Assemblyman Mike Roos. These bills would have provided guidelines for surrogate
parenting contracts. In particular, A.B. 3771 would have restricted the use of surrogate
contracts to infertile couples only; A.B. 1707 was introduced in 1985-86 by former Assemblywoman Jean M. Duffy (D-Citrus Heights). The bill was designed to authorize and
regulate surrogate arrangements. The bill attempted to deal with the rights and responsibilities of parties to surrogate contracts; A.B. 2304 and A.B. 2404 were introduced in
1987 by the late Assemblyman Richard Longshore (R-Westminster). These were two related measures. One would have prohibited a woman from relinquishing custody of her
child before it was born and the other would have voided surrogacy contracts that required unnecessary tests, such as one to determine the sex of an unborn child; S. 2635
was introduced by Senator Diane Watson (D-Los Angeles) in 1988 and would have established parental relationships and regulated surrogacy; A.B. 3200 was introduced in 1988
by Assemblywoman Sunny Mojonnier (R-San Diego). This bill sought to establish that
the woman who gives birth to a child is the legal mother of that child, regardless of the
child's genetic background. It would also expressly prohibit contract parenting for a fee;
A.B. 2100 was introduced in 1989 also by Assemblywoman Mojonnier. This bill stated
that contracts to bear a child are against public policy and are void and unenforceable.
L. A. Daily Journal, July 14, 1988, at 1, col. 6. The Alternative Reproduction Act of 1989
was introduced by Assemblyman Terry B. Friedman (D-Sherman Oaks). This bill would
have authorized surrogacy procedures and enforcement of surrogate contracts and egg
donor contracts. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at M82-M99.
25. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
26. The Joint Committee on Surrogate Parenting's [hereinafter Joint Committee)
members were Assemblywoman Sunny Mojonnier, Chair; Senator Robert Presley, Vice
Chair; Senator Ed Davis; Senator Diane Watson; Assemblyman Mike Roos; and Assemblywoman Jackie Speier.
27. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4.
28. ACR-l71 created the Joint Committee on Surrogate Parenting, and directed and
authorized the Joint Committee to ascertain, study and critically analyze materials concerning commercial and noncommercial parenting. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES: BILL INTRODUCTIONS IN 1988 LEGISLATIVE SESSIONS RELATING TO SURROGACY
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port to the Joint Committee, the Majority Report of the Advisory Panel 29 recommended legislation prohibiting commercial
surrogacy in California and imposing criminal sanctions for participation in surrogacy arrangements. 30 It based these recommendations upon a comparison between adoption issues and
their relationship to surrogacy,31 finding that legalized paid surrogacy will have negative effects on the children involved, surrogates and society.32 However, the Minority Report of the Advisory Panel 33 recommended that legislation be enacted to clarify
the legality of surrogate parenting agreements, urging that they
be considered void, and that where a dispute arises, custody of
the child should be determined based upon a best interest analysis. 34 Members of the Minority Report argued that there is no
empirical evidence to indicate that significant harm has been
suffered by women who have been surrogate mothers.311 They
also asserted that there is no evidence to suggest significant
harm to the siblings of children born by surrogates. 36
The dissenting viewpoints expressed in the Minority Report
are indicative of the controversy nationwide. Proponents of surCONTRACTS.
29. Twelve members of the Advisory Panel supported the FINAL REPORT, while the
dissenting Minority Report was ascribed to by six members. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4,
at M1.
30. The Advisory Panel Report recommends the following:
Amend CAL. PENAL CODE § 273 to prohibit payment to a surrogate mother for other
than expenses allowed in all other adoption procedures; add to CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)
to prohibit commercial surrogacy agencies; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 224(p) to prohibit
advertising for surrogacy; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 to designate as the natural father
the party of a surrogate parenting agreement who donates his semen for artificial insemination; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 7015 to provide that when ova or embryos have come
from a woman other than the one who gives birth, the gestating woman is irrebuttably
presumed to be the natural mother; amend CAL. CIV. CODE § 1669 to make surrogate
mother agreements void and unenforceable. FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, 20-31.
31. [d. at 7-17.
32. [d.
33. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 2.
34. [d. at M3. The Minority Report additionally concluded that regulatory means
should be used to protect the interests of the parties involved in surrogacy arrangements,
rather than criminalizing all surrogate-related activities. [d.
35. [d. at MI5-MI7. (discussion of several studies that have been conducted indicating no significant harm has been caused to surrogate mothers).
36. [d. at MI8-MI9. Nevertheless, the Minority Report concedes that very little
data exists regarding the surrogate mother's children and their reactions to the surrogate
pregnancy and relinquishment of the resulting child to the biological father and his wife.
[d. at M18.
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rogacy rely on Constitutional principles 37 in support of an individual's right to pursue new reproductive technologies without
interference from the government. The Constitutional right of
privacy,38 which includes the right to procreative choice,39 is asserted as an argument in support of surrogacy.40 The Constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process are also
raised in support of surrogacy agreements. Infertile couples contend that based upon these constitutional principles, all individuals should have equal access to available reproductive technologies to overcome infertility. The basis for the current assertion
of these constitutional rights arose in earlier cases affirming certain procreative rights. 41
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut 42 affirmed
the right of a married couple to use contraceptives, based on its
finding that the right of privacy is a fundamental Constitutional
guarantee. 43 It is argued that as a fundamental right, the right of
privacy, including the right to procreative choice!4 empowers individuals to use alternative methods of reproduction in their
pursuit of this right. 41i Whether or not the right to procreative
choice actually extends to the use of a surrogate remains at
issue.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The 14th amendment provides:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
38. The Constitutional right of privacy is an implied right under the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. However, the right of privacy under the California
Constitution is an express right. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. I, § 1 (1974): "All people are by
nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing
and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." (emphasis added).
39. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965);
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 836, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 46, 47 (1989); Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 262,
625 P.2d 779, 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 871 (1981).
40. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
41. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Id. at 485.
44. See supra note 39.
45. See supra note 39.
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In Eisenstadt v. Baird,46 the Supreme Court expanded this
right of procreative choice by upholding a single person's right
to use contraceptives, as guaranteed by the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Proponents of surrogacy
claim that equal protection guarantees prohibit arbitrarily
drawn distinctions between persons who are similarly situated,48
and therefore a man is being denied equal protection when he is
prohibited from reproducing through a surrogacy arrangement. 49
Since couples are allowed to have the biological child of the woman through artificial insemination if the man is sterile, banning
surrogacy would prohibit couples from having the biological
child of the man when the woman is infertile. lio Opponents contend, however, that due to the differences in the nature and extent of the responsibility involved, the state may distinguish between surrogacy and artificial insemination. iiI
Legislation recently introduced in California li2 seeks to provide guidance to the judiciary in resolving surrogacy disputes.
This bill provides that contracts which attempt to establish parent and child relationships are void as a matter of public policy.lis For third-party assisted childbearing,M parent and child
relationships are to be governed by an amendment to the Civil
Code. 1i1i
The amended statute would require that all parties be informed, orally and in writing, of the legal effect of the statute
and must consent in writing. 1i6 This writing would indicate the
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

47. See supra note 37.
48. FIELD, supra note I, at 47.
49.Id.
50. Id. This argument addresses the use of artificial insemination by donor (AID),
rather than artificial insemination by husband (AIH).
51. Id .. at 48.
52. S.B. 937 (introduced by Senator Watson, March 1991).
53. S.B. 937, § 2.
54. The term "third-party assisted childbearing" describes arrangements in which a
third party is utilized to assist in childbearing. The methods encompassed in the statute
include the donation of sperm, the donation of ovum, or the donation of gestational abilities. Id. at § 1(a).
55. S.B. 937, § 3.
56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 would be amended to read in pertinent part:
(f) The consent of all parties is required in all cases of thirdparty assisted childbearing pursuant to this section, and at
least 30 days prior to an attempt to conceive a child, the hus-

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/3

8

Lawrence: Surrogacy in California

1991]

SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA

533

specific intent of the parties regarding custody of a child conceived through third-party assisted childbearing. 1I7
By providing that contracts attempting to establish parent
and child relationships are void as a matter of public policy, the
statute deems that surrender of a child cannot be controlled exclusively by the terms of the contract. Nevertheless, the written
consent reflecting the specific intent of the parties attempts to
accomplish the same result of awarding custody to the intended
parents. Presumably factors other than the intent evidenced in
the writing would be considered by the court in determining
custody.
Until legislation is enacted which establishes the rights of
the parties to a surrogacy agreement, current law in California
does not adequately address such arrangements. Only case law
provides guidance in resolving certain surrogacy agreements.
B.

STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY NATIONWIDE

As California seeks a solution to the surrogacy controversy,
other states have addressed surrogacy legislatively and provide
insight into the options available.
Numerous state legislatures have introduced or enacted surrogacy legislation in recent years. 1I8 During the legislative sesband and wife and the third party providing either semen,
ovum, or gestational abilities, shall be informed, orally and in
writing, of the legal effect of this section upon the parent and
child relationships involved, and shall consent in writing, indicating, among other things, all of the following:
(1) The specific intent of the parties regarding who shall
have custody of the child thereby conceived.
(2) The knowledge of the parties of the legal effect of this
section upon the parent and child relationships created by
their participation in third-party assisted childbearing.
(Presumably an attorney would inform the parties of the legal effect of the statute,
although the proposed statutory amendment does not recommend the use of independent counsel for the third party donating sperm, ovum or gestational abilities).
57. [d.
58. The breakdown of state bill introductions on surrogate parenting contracts for
1987-1989 is as follows: 72 bills in 1987; 70 bills in 1988; and 63 bills in 1989. Only eleven
states had no legislative activity during these years, which indicates the increasing attention being given to surrogacy throughout the states. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at
10.
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sions of 1987 through 1989, twelve states enacted legislation
dealing with surrogate parenting contracts. 1I9 In 1990, only one
state enacted surrogacy legislation. 60
The legislation ranges from unenforceability of surrogate
parenting agreements with criminal penalties for any violations61
to legal enforceability of the practice. 62 While a number of states
permit surrogate arrangements without imposing criminal sanctions, these states provide that ultimately the contracts are void
and unenforceable if a dispute arises among the parties. 63
Only one state, Arkansas, provides that a child born of a
surrogate arrangement is legally the child of the party contracting with the surrogate mother.6" However, because the Arkansas statute does not address the commercial aspects of a surrogate parenting agreement, one must look to the state's child
selling statutes and adoption laws to determine if commercial
surrogate parenting agreements are legally enforceable. 611 Other
than the costs of medical and legal expenses, paying a fee to the
biological mother for her consent to adoption is prohibited by
the child selling statutes. 66 Thus commercial surrogacy appears
59. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (Supp. 1990); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1991);
FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-3 to -2-3 (West Supp.
1990); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (West Supp. 1991); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 722.851 to .861
(West Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287
(Michie Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-204 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991).
60. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8 (Supp. 1990).
61. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (MichielBobbs-MerrillI982 & Supp. 1990); MICH.
COMPo LAWS §§ 722.851 to .861 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-8 (Supp.
1990).
62. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201 (1991).
63. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-3 to -2-3 (West Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:2713 (West Supp. 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 1418-01 to -07 (Supp. 1989).
64. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-1O-201(b) (1991) states in pertinent part:
[I)n the case of a surrogate mother. . . the child shall be that
of: (1) the biological father and the woman intended to be the
mother if the biological father is married; or (2) the biological
father only if unmarried; or (3) the woman intended to be the
mother in cases of a surrogate mother when an anonymous donor's sperm was utilized for artificial insemination.
65. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
66. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 9-9-206(c) (1991) provides: "Under no circumstances maya
parent or guardian of a minor receive a fee, compensation, or any other thing of value as
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contrary to the child selling statutes in Arkansas. 67
Nevada's legislation on adoption includes a subsection relating to surrogacy, but it is not clear if a surrogate parenting contract ultimately will be upheld. 68 The courts have not yet determined if the adoption law is in conflict with Nevada's child
selling statutes. Thus it is unknown whether or not such contracts can be enforced.
In Florida, the statute permits individuals to enter into
preplanned adoption arrangements, but only permits payment of
related and reasonable legal, medical, psychiatric and living expenses of the volunteer mother.69
The first state to adopt the Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act7° is North Dakota. 71 Any contract
wherein a woman agrees to relinquish her rights and duties as a
parent of a child conceived through assisted conception is void,
in which case the surrogate is legally the mother of a resulting
child. 72 Although most states that have enacted surrogacy legisa consideration for the relinquishment of a minor for adoption .... "
67. To date there have been no legal disputes over surrogacy contracts in the Arkansas courts. It therefore is not yet known if a court will hold such a contact enforceable,
especially in light of the child selling statutes.
68. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(5) (Michie Supp. 1989) provides that "[t]he provisions of this section do not apply if a woman enters into a lawful contract to act as a
surrogate, be inseminated and give birth to the child of a man who is not her husband."
69. FLA. STAT. § 63.212 (1985 & Supp. 1991). Payments to brokers as a finder's fee
are also prohibited. The preplanned adoption agreement must include numerous provisions, including a right of rescission by the volunteer mother any time within seven days
after the birth of the child. Finally, a violator of a statutory provision is guilty of a felony
of the third degree, which carries penalties up to $5,000 and/or imprisonment up to five
years. [d.
70. This Act was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. North Dakota adopted "Alternative B" of the Uniform Act. STATE LEGIS.
REP., supra note 3, at 4.
71. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-18-01 to -07 (Supp. 1989). N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05
(Supp. 1989) pertains to surrogate agreements:
Any agreement in which a woman agrees to become a surrogate or to relinquish her rights and duties as parent of a child
conceived through assisted conception is void. The surrogate,
however, is the mother of a resulting child and the surrogate's
husband, if a party to the agreement, is the father of the child.
If the surrogate's husband is not a party to the agreement or
the surrogate is unmarried, paternity of the child is governed
by chapter 14-17.
72. [d. The North Dakota child selling statute specifically excludes surrogate
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lation appear to permit voluntary surrogacy as opposed to paid
surrogacy, Arizona makes all surrogate parenting contracts
illegal. 73
Indiana,74 Louisiana7& and Nebraska76 declare surrogate
mother contracts. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-05 (Supp. 1989). Thus while payment to
the surrogate is not specifically prohibited, a surrogate parenting contract cannot be en·
forced if there is a dispute between the parties.
73. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (Supp. 1990) states:
A. No person may enter into, induce, arrange, procure or oth·
erwise assist in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract.
B. A surrogate is the legal mother of a child born as a result of
a surrogate parentage contract and is entitled to custody of
that child.
C. If the mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate con·
tract is married, her husband is presumed to be the legal fa·
ther of the child. This presumption is rebuttable.
D. For the purposes of this section, 'surrogate parentage con·
tract' means a contract, agreement or arrangement in which a
woman agrees to the implantation of an embryo not related to
that woman or agrees to conceive a child through natural or
artificial insemination and to voluntarily relinquish her paren·
tal rights to the child.
(This statute does not appear to distinguish between paid and voluntary surrogacy
arrangements).
74. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-8-1-3 to -2-3 (West Supp. 1990). IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-1
(West Supp. 1990) declares that:
[I)t is against. public policy to enforce any term of a surrogate
agreement that requires a surrogate to do any of the following:
(1) Provide a gamete to conceive a child.
(2) Become pregnant.
(3) Consent to undergo or undergo an abortion.
(4) Undergo medical or psychological treatment or
examination.
(5) Use a substance or engage in activity only in accordance
with the demands of another person.
(6) Waive parental rights or duties to a child.
(7) Terminate care, custody, or control of a child.
(8) Consent to a stepparent adoption under IC 31-3-1.
Additionally, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-2 (West Supp. 1990) provides that such a surro·
gate agreement is void. This statute does not appear to distinguish between voluntary
and paid surrogacy arrangements.
75. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (West Supp. 1991) states that "A contract for
surrogate motherhood. . . shall be absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable
as contrary to public policy." However, there are no penalties for violations of the
statute.
76. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (1989) provides:
(1) A surrogate parenthood contract entered into shall be void
and unenforceable. The biological father of a child born pur·
suant to such a contract shall have all the rights and obliga·
tions imposed by law with respect to such child.
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parenting contracts to be against public policy and therefore
void and unenforceable. Such statutes do not penalize those participating in surrogate parenting agreements, but nevertheless
alert the parties that these contracts are unenforceable should a
dispute arise as to custody of the child. As a result, individuals
in these states are deterred from entering into surrogacy agreements initially.
The final category of surrogate parenting statutes imposes
criminal sanctions against anyone involved in a commercial surrogate parenting agreement. 77 Within this group of statutes,
however, the criminal classifications range from a misdemeanor
to a felony with a penalty of up to $50,000 and/or imprisonment.
Utah,78 Washington,79 Kentucky80 and Michigan 81 prohibit com(2) For purposes of this section, unless the context otherwise
requires, a surrogate parenthood contract shall mean a contract by which a woman is to be compensated for bearing a
child of a man who is not her husband.
This statute defines such a contract as one in which the surrogate mother is to be compensated and does not address voluntary surrogacy.
77. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill1982 & Supp. 1990); MICH.
COMPo LAWS §§ 722.851 to .861 (West Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp.
1990).
78. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1990). The statute declares that:
(l)(a) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may be
a party to a contract for profit or gain in which a woman
agrees to undergo artificial insemination or other procedures
and subsequently terminate her parental rights to a child born
as a result.
(b) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may facilitate a contract prohibited by Subsection (1).
(c) Contracts or agreements entered into in violation of this
section are null and void, and unenforceable as contrary to
public policy.
(d) A violation of this subsection is a class A misdemeanor.
Although there are no penalties for entering into a voluntary agreement, it is nevertheless unenforceable. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(2) (1990). Finally, if a custody dispute
arises under either of the above sections, the court is not bound by the contract terms,
but is to make its custody decision based solely on the best interests of the child. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-204(3)(b) (1990).
79. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210 to .260 (Supp. 1991). WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.240 (Supp. 1991) declares that: "A surrogate parentage contract entered into for
compensation, whether executed in the state of Washington or in another jurisdiction,
shall be void and unenforceable in the state of Washington as contrary to public policy."
Additionally, WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.250 (Supp. 1991) provides: "Any person, organization, or agency who intentionally violates any provision . . . shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor." If a custody dispute arises between the parties, the party having physical
custody of the child may retain physical custody until the court orders otherwise, and
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mercial surrogate parenting agreements by declaring them void
and unenforceable, and provide for criminal penalties of fines
and/or imprisonment. New Hampshire allows and regulates surrogacy agreements, but one is guilty of a misdemeanor if compensation other than reasonable and related medical, legal, psychological and living expenses is involved. 82
the court will award legal custody of the child based on factors weighing the best inter·
ests of the child pursuant to the Washington child custody statutes. WASH. REV. CODE §
26.26.260 (Supp. 1991).
80. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990). This
statute provides in pertinent part:
(3) No person, agency, institution, or intermediary shall be a
party to a contract or agreement which would compensate a
woman for her artificial insemination and subsequent termination of parental rights to a child born as a result of that artificial insemination. No person, agency, institution or intermediary shall receive compensation for the facilitation of contracts
or agreements as proscribed by this subsection. Contracts or
agreements entered into in violation of this subsection shall be
void.
In a separate statute, penalties are set for providing compensation to a surrogate mother
or for acting as a broker between the parties to a surrogacy arrangement. A violation of
this provision results in a fine of $500 to $2,000 or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both. Kv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.990(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp.
1990).
81. MICH. COMPo LAWS §§ 722.851 to .863 (West Supp. 1990). MICH. COMPo LAWS §
722.855 (West Supp. 1990) provides: "A surrogate parentage contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy." Furthermore, any person who enters into or arranges a surrogate parentage contract for compensation is guilty of a crime. A participating party is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine up to $10,000 or imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 722.859(2). However, anyone
other than a participating party who assists in the formation of a surrogate parentage
contract for compensation is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of up to $50,000 or
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 722.859(3). If a
dispute arises concerning custody of the child, the party having physical custody may
retain physical custody until the circuit court orders otherwise. This court will then
award legal custody of the child based on a best interest determination. MICH. COMPo
LAWS § 722.861.
82. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B (Supp. 1990). N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16
(Supp. 1990) provides in relevant part:
I. A surrogate arrangement is lawful only if it conforms to the
requirements of this subdivision, and if, before the procedure
to impregnate the surrogate:
(a) The health care provider performing the procedure receives written certification that the parties successfully completed the medical and nonmedical evaluations and counseling
(b) The surrogate arrangement has been judicially
preauthorized . . . .
(c) All parties to the surrogacy contract provide the health
care provider performing the procedure with written indica-
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While the states legislating surrogacy are few in number,
they indicate the growing desire of legislatures to enact laws relating specifically to surrogacy. Application of adoption laws to .
surrogacy does not adequately take into consideration the differences in the two arrangements. Agreements involving new reproductive technologies and third-party assistance in childbearing
take place prior to conception, while adoption is a subsequent
change in the parental status of the parties after the birth of a
child.
Legislatures have several options. One choice is to prohibit
surrogacy entirely and provide for criminal sanctions. However,
criminalization of surrogate parenting agreements may have the
unfortunate result of either driving the practice underground or
encouraging prospective parents to relocate to states permitting
surrogate parent agreements.
Another option is to provide for regulation of the practice.
The state can ensure that the parties to surrogate parenting
agreements are adequately counseled and informed prior to entering into the agreements. All parties will enter the agreements
with full knowledge of their rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, if the agencies which arrange surrogate agreements are required to follow specified procedures, abuses of the process may
be less likely to occur.
Although a relatively small number of states have enacted
surrogacy legislation during the last several years, many more
have introduced such legislation or have established study commissions to examine the issue. Rather than leave the process of
enacting surrogacy legislation to individual states, several legislators advocate national legislation on this controversial subject.
tion of their informed consent to the arrangement . . . .
IV. No person or entity shall promote or in any other way solicit or induce for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or with the intent or expectation of receiving the
same, any party or parties to enter into a surrogacy
arrangement.
Additionally, mandatory terms for a surrogacy contract are set forth, including a provision that the surrogate has 72 hours after the birth of the child to decide to keep it. N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25 (Supp. 1990).
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PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Whether or not surrogate parenting agreements should be
legislated by Congress or by the individual state legislatures is
another issue in the surrogacy debate. While state legislatures
continue to examine or enact new legislation concerning surrogacy, several bills to prohibit surrogacy have been introduced in
Congress. 83
One of the more recent bills on surrogacy introduced in
Congress84 would make it a crime to enter into or act as an intermediary in a commercial surrogacy arrangement. 811 Furthermore,
anyone who advertises the availability of a surrogate arrangement is also subject to criminal sanctions. 86 Although such legislation bans commercial surrogacy, it does not address private,
voluntary surrogacy arrangements. 87 The enforceability of such
agreements would be left to resolution by the judiciary.88
Another recently introduced bill 8D also concerns commercial
surrogate arrangements. This bill essentially provides that such
an agreement may not be enforced and prohibits brokering a
commercialized childbearing agreement. DO
Those advocating federal legislation of surrogate parenting
agreements believe that if left to the individual State legislatures, it will take years before a regulated or banned form of
surrogacy is enacted by all the state legislatures. D1 Different laws
in different states on this volatile issue may create further
problems if infertile couples should decide to change residency
83. H.R. 275, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. 1188, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989);
H.R. 2433, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). To date no new federal surrogacy legislation has
been introduced in Congress.
84. H.R. 275, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
85. Id. at 2.
86. Id. at 2·3.
87.Id.
88. One commentator exposes the anomaly of a law which declares as void and un·
enforceable a paid surrogacy agreement while at the same time a voluntary surrogacy
agreement is enforceable. FIELD, supra note 1, at 23.
89. H.R. 1188, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
90. Id. at 2-3.
91. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2433 Before the Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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solely to hire a surrogate in a state which permits commercialized childbearing. Interstate conflicts over this issue could erupt
periodically as a result of geographically diverse laws. s2
Legislation is needed to provide the judiciary with guidance
in deciding surrogacy cases. Advocates of federal legislation wish
to avoid uncertainties through the enactment of federal surrogacy laws. However, such legislation definitely lies within the
realm of state legislatures. s3 Each state legislature can explore
the issues surrounding surrogacy independently and implement
laws reflecting its decided public policy. What is agreed upon is
that legislation needs to be enacted.

II. SURROGACY CASES
A surprisingly small number of surrogacy cases have gone to
triaP4 However, these illuminate the issues central to the surrogacy controversy.
A.

TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CASES

By prohibiting the exchange of money in an adoption and
similar proceedings, the Michigan Court of Appeals in Doe u.
Kelley S5 denied a couple's claim that certain statutory provisions
were unconstitutional. While the court recognized that the decision to bear or beget a child is a fundamental interest protected
92. See Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L.
REV. 399 (analyzing four hypothetical fact situations involving two different jurisdictions;
and discussing the means by which a restrictive state can deter the out-of-state conduct
of those attempting to avoid local law).
93. Surrogacy Arrangements Act of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 2433 Before the Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism, and Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Family law matters such as adoption have traditionally been matters of State concern and the states can adopt laws suited to their
own needs (statement of Bob Whittacker, member, Subcomm. on Transp., Tourism, and
Hazardous Materials).
94. There have been less than five cases in California during the past ten years involving surrogate parenting arrangements, while the number of reported cases discovered
in the United States is approximately ten. Using these estimates, approximately .01 % of
California surrogacy arrangements and .0025% of all cases nationwide resulted in a legal
dispute. MINORITY REPORT, supra note 2, at MI0.
95. 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), leaue to appeal denied, 414 Mich.
875 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983).
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by the right of privacy,96 that right is not a valid prohibition to
state interference in such an agreement. 97 The statute 98 at issue
prohibits payment in conjunction with use of adoption procedures,99 although it does not directly prohibit the couple from
having the child as planned. loo
In Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Commonwealth
ex ret. Armstrong,lOl the Supreme Court of Kentucky determined that a surrogate parenting procedure was not prohibited
by then current law. Although an amended statute l02 prohibited
the purchase of a child for adoption or any other purpose, including termination of parental rights,103 the court held it did
not apply to the surrogate parenting procedure because the
agreement was entered into prior to conception. lo, However, a
surrogate parenting agreement in Kentucky at that time was determined to be voidable by the surrogate, pursuant to the termination of parental rights statute 1011 and the consent to adoption
96. [d. at 173, 307 N.W.2d at 441.

97. [d.
98. MICH. COMPo LAWS § 710.54 (1967) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (555.54) (Callaghan 1987)) provides:
(1) Except for charges and fees approved by the court, a person shall not offer, give, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in connection with any of the
following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption.
(b) The registration, recording, or communication of the existence of a child available for adoption or the existence of a
person interested in adopting a child.
(c) A release.
(d) A consent.
(e) A petition.
99. Doe, 106 Mich. App. at 170-74, 307 N.W.2d at 439, 441.
100. [d. at 173-74, 307 N.W.2d at 441.
101. 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986).
102. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1990):
"No person, agency, institution, or intermediary may sell or purchase or procure for sale
or purchase any child for the purpose of adoption or any other purpose, including termination of parental rights . . . . "
103. Surrogate, 704 S.W.2d at 211.
104. [d. (The court determined that Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1982 & Supp. 1990) was intended to prevent baby brokers from coercing an expectant mother or parents of a child into relinquishing a child through financial
inducement).
105. [d. at 210. (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.601(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 &
Supp. 1990) prohibits filing a petition for voluntary termination of parental rights "prior
to five (5) days after the birth of 8 child.")
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statute. lOS Thus, while surroga~y contracts were voidable, they
were not deemed illegal. l07 Ultimately the court correctly concluded that this volatile issue of public policy should be resolved
by legislation, not by the judiciary.l08 The two dissenting opinions in this case viewed the surrogate parenting procedure at issue as one involving the termination of parental rights in exchange for a monetary consideration, thus being no less than the
sale of a child. lOS
The New York Surrogate's Court of Nassau County determined in Adoption of Baby Girl L.J.llo that then current legislation did not expressly prohibit the use or compensation of surrogate mothers under surrogate parenting agreements. III Such
arrangements were deemed to be voidable, although not void.ll2
The court requested that the legislature review the practice of
surrogate parenting and the payments involved to determine
whether they should be permitted or prohibited through statutory provisions. ll3
In the landmark case of In re Baby M,1l4 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey invalidated surrogacy contracts as being
contrary to the law and public policy of the State.1lII Furthermore, it voided both the termination of the surrogate mother's
parental rights l1S and the adoption of the child by the biological
father's wife.ll7
On the issue of parental rights, the court stated that the
purpose and effect of the surrogacy contract was to give the fa106. Id. (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp.
1990) specifies that a "consent to adoption" shall not "be held valid if such consent for
adoption is given prior to the fifth day after the birth of the child").
107. Surrogate, 704 S.W.2d at 213. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (Kentucky law now expressly prohibits commercial surrogate parenting agreements by declaring them void and unenforceable and imposing criminal sanctions for violation of the
statutes).
108. Id. at 214.
109. Id. at 214-15 (Vance, J., dissenting; Wintersheimer, J., dissenting).
110. 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sur. Ct. 1986).
111. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
112. Id. at 977, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
113. Id. at 978, 505 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
114. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
115. Id. at 411, 537 A.2d at 1234.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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ther exclusive right to the child. Therefore the surrogacy agreement violated State policy because natural parents have equal
rights concerning the child.1l8
The court also discussed the commercial issues of surrogacy.

It expressed the belief that money was being paid to obtain an
adoption, and not for the personal services of the surrogate
mother.Il9
In Adoption of Paul,12O the New York Family Court in
Kings County found that the language of New York's adoption
statutes must be controlling to determine the legality of the surrogate parenting agreement at issue. 121 Although numerous surrogacy bills were introduced in the New York Legislature,122
ranging from complete prohibition to complex regulation, none
passed prior to the decision in this case. Consequen~ly, the court
looked to current state law governing adoption. 123 Compensation
given to the surrogate mother directly for her "services" in conceiving, carrying and giving birth to the child was not
permitted. 124
The court concluded that the surrogate contract provided
for the sale of a child, or at least the sale of a mother's right to
her child, in direct contravention of the state's laws prohibiting
payment for a child.12I! Consequently, such contracts were
deemed to be void in the State of New York. 126 The court's
agreement to accept the mother's surrender of her child and
subsequent termination of parental rights was conditioned upon
all parties providing sworn affidavits that no compensation was
118. [d. at 435, 537 A.2d at 1247.
119. [d. at 424, 537 A.2d at 1241.

120. 146 Misc. 2d 379, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815 (Fam. Ct. 1990).
121. [d. at 382, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
122. [d.
123. New York's adoption laws prohibit the request, acceptance, receipt, payment,
or gift of "any compensation or thing of value, directly or indirectly, in connection with
the placing out or adoption of a child or for assisting a parent, relative or guardian of a
child in arranging for the placement of the child for the purpose of adoption" by any
person other than an authorized agency. N.Y. Soc. SERvo LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 1983
& Supp. 1991). [d. at 383, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 817.
124. [d.
125. [d. at 384·85, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
126. [d.
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to be paid or accepted. 127 The surrender of parental rights had
to be truly voluntary and motivated solely by the child's best
interests. Only then would the biological father and his wife be
permitted to adopt the child. 128
Interwoven in the arguments presented in the cases are the
most central issues of all. These concern the effect of surrogacy
on society as a whole, and the effect specifically on our view of
women and children within society. Proponents of surrogacy
contend that it is a service, not a child, which is being provided
and compensated. Most surrogacy contracts state that consideration is for the services performed by the surrogate. This wording is designed to prevent application of state adoption laws,
which prohibit payment for a child.
Proponents of surrogacy contend that a surrogate voluntarily enters into such a contract and should therefore be subject
to its enforcement. 129 However, opponents argue that it is questionable whether or not the decision to become a surrogate
mother is actually "voluntary."13o Generally the fee paid to a
surrogate mother is $10,000. 131 To a woman who is economically
disadvantaged, this standard fee may be a sufficient inducement
to enter into such an agreement. Some have expressed concern
that eventually women from third world countries will be hired
as cheap labor to bear children for couples in the United
States. 132 Regulation providing for a complete evaluation of potential surrogates, including their motives and financial stability,
should be required to ensure that the risk of exploitation is minimal. However, only those with substantial financial resources
will be able to pursue this method of alternative reproduction,
while the poor in society will remain at a disadvantage in their
attempts to overcome infertility. As evidenced by the surrogacy
cases and the underlying controversial issues, legislation is necessary to determine the legality of surrogate parenting
127. Id. at 385, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
128. Id.
129. See Note, Rumpelstiltskin Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate
Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1954 (1986) [hereinafter Inalienable Rights].
130. SHANNON, supra note 17, at 49-65 (discussing coercive aspects of the new reproductive technologies and the possibility that the financial gain may be "inducement, perhaps undue, but not essentially coercive"). Id. at 65.
131. STATE LEGIS. REP., supra note 3, at 1.
132. G. COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 274 (1985).
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agreements.

B.

GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CASE

. The cases discussed thus far all involve traditional surrogacy.133 In California, a gestational surrogate mother l34 and the
genetic father and mother each brought suit to establish legal
parenthood in Johnson u. Caluert. m This case is one of first impression for both California and the nation.
1.

Factual Background

During the fall and winter of 1989-1990, Anna Johnson and
a married couple, Mark and Crispina Calvert, met and discussed
entering into an agreement whereby Johnson would serve as a
gestational surrogate and carry the Calvert's fertilized emb ryo l36
to term. 137 The agreement provided for a payment of $10,000 to
Johnson and stated that she would claim no interest in the
child. 138 On January 15, 1990, Anna Johnson signed an agreement with Crispina and Mark Calvert, which provided that upon
the child's birth Johnson would relinquish the child to the
Calverts and would make no claim for parental rights. 13D
On January 19, 1990, a fertilized embryo of the Calverts was
implanted in Johnson. Ho She delivered a baby boy on Septem133. See supra note 1 (discussing traditional and gestational surrogacy).
134. Id.
135. Nos. X-633190, AD-57638 (Orange County Super. Ct., Decided Oct. 22, 1990),
appeal filed, No. G010225 (Cal. Ct. App. March 15, 1991). (Johnson filed a complaint,
dated August 13, 1990, for declaratory relief in superior court for a determination that
she was the biological mother of the child, should be given custody of the child and be
awarded damages for breach of contract and misrepresentation. The Cal verts brought
suit seeking a declaration that they were the legal parents. The cases were consolidated).
See L.A. Daily Journal, Sept. 27, 1990, at I, col. 4; TIME MAGAZINE, Aug. 27, 1990, at 53:
136. The procedure in this case involved an in vitro fertilization embryo transfer, in
which the Calverts' egg and sperm were fertilized in vitro and subsequently implanted in
Johnson for gestation. The National Law Journal, Nov. 5, 1990, at 3, col. 3. Crispina
Calvert had had a hysterectomy and thus was unable to carry a child.
137. Johnson v. Calvert, No. X633190 (Orange County Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990),
Reporter's Transcript, Statement of Decision, at 1481.
138. Id. at 1481-82.
139. Id. at 1482.
140. Id.
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ber 19, 1990. 141 Chemical tests performed on all the parties and
the child demonstrated that Johnson had no genetic relationship
to the child, and that there was a 99.999 percent probability that
the Cal verts were the genetic parents of the child.142
After the birth of the child, an initial award of temporary
custody was given to the Calverts and Johnson had visitation
rights pending resolution of the controversy. 143

2.

The Trial Court Decision

Judge Richard N. Parslow, Jr. found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Crispina and Mark Calvert were the genetic, biological and natural parents of the child. 144
The most significant finding of Judge Parslow was that although Johnson made a substantial contribution to the child, a
surrogate carrying the genetic child 146 of a couple does not acquire parental rights. 146 He based his finding of no parental
rights for Johnson on two approaches: That there are no parental rights in an in vitro fertilization case in which the surrogate
is not genetically related to the child; and that even if there were
parental rights, in this case they were relinquished in the contract by the gestational carrier. 147 He viewed Johnson's relationship to the child as analogous to that of a foster parent who
cares for a child during the period of time when the child's natural mother is unable to do SO.148 Therefore, upon the birth of the
child, Crispina Calvert was able to assume the care of the
child. 149
Secondly, Judge Parslow viewed gestational surrogacy contracts in the in vitro fertilization cases as neither void nor
against public policy.160 The contract was entered into by the
141. [d.
142. [d.

143. L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 1, 1990, at 5, col. 1.
144. Johnson, at 1482-83.
145. See supra note 136.
146. Johnson, at 1485.
147. [d. at 1487-88.
148. [d. at 1483.
149. [d. at 1484-85.
150. [d. at 1489.
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parties before implantation of the embryo and had a provision
concerning relinquishment. lIi1 The trial court judge believed this
provision was enforceable by either specific performance or arguably even by habeas corpus. m He alluded to earlier case law
on procreative rights, but stated that the procreative rights involved in gestational surrogacy concern the right of the genetic
mother, not the procreative right of the gestational mother!1I3
Judge Parslow relied heavily on the testimony of one of the
defendants' expert witnesses. 1114 The expert testified that there is
no clear evidence of emotional bonding between the child and
the mother in the uterine environment. 11111 Furthermore, this expert testified that psychologically there is less likelihood for the
person carrying the child to bond with the child, since the original plan is that the child is the genetic child of another couple
and will be raised by them exclusively.1116
Finally, the trial court judge determined that a finding of
three natural parents would not be in the best interests of the
child. 1117 The judge found that this would be true in any in vitro
fertilization case. IllS He discussed public policy problems if the
child had three natural parents, such as bitter, protracted custody disputes. 1119 He also commented on the confusion which a
three-parent arrangement would create for a child. 160
The judge made a number of recommendations to the state
legislature. 161 First, he suggested that intensive psychological
evaluation of the parties should be conducted, arguably by an
151. [d.
152. [d.
153. [d. at 1493-94.
154. [d. at 1487. Dr. Call testified regarding bonding between the child and the

mother during gestation.
155. [d. The judge conceded that "[T)here may be and usually is and often is a
bonding between a person carrying the child and the child. That's not universal, but it
.
does happen." [d.
156. [d. at 1490. But see M. KLAUS, MATERNAL-INFANT BONDING, at 45 (1976) (arguing there is evidence that women begin to feel attached to the child during pregnancy).
He states that "[s)ignificant affectional bonding had been established by the time of or
soon after the birth of the child." [d. at '46.
157. Johnson, at 1492.
158.
159.
160.
161.

[d.
[d. at 1488.
[d. at 1492.
[d. at 1494-97.
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independent agency.162 Second, he would require that the genetic mother be unable medically to carry a child to term. 163
Third, that it should be completely clear prior to implantation
for in vitro fertilization cases that all the parties understand
that the child will go to the genetic parents immediately after
birth, and that the surrogate will have no parental rights. 164
Fourth, the surrogate should have previously carried at least one
child to term, to assist the surrogate in the decision-making
process. 165
Judge Parslow saw no problem with a surrogate receiving a
fee, payment being for the pain and suffering involved with carrying a child to term. 166 He stated that a baby is not being sold,
only the pain and suffering that goes with carrying a child to
term is being compensated. 167
3.

Analysis of Johnson v. Calvert

As the first legal custody case involving gestational surrogacy, Johnson v. Calvert raises additional issues not previously
addressed in traditional surrogacy cases. It also illustrates the
need for legislation in California encompassing all potential
third-party assisted childbearing methods}68 Since Judge Parslow's decision specifically addressed gestational surrogacY,169 it
may prove to have insubstantial persuasive value for future
traditional surrogacy cases. 170
The superior court decision awarding sole legal and physical
custody of the child to the Calverts was based upon three cen162. [d. at 1494.
163. [d. at 1495. This would be to ensure that women able to carry a child, but not
wishing to interrupt career plans or to endure pregnancy, would not be able to enter into
a surrogacy arrangement.
164. [d.
165. [d. at 1497. (This recommendation for legislation is without validity, since an
equal protection argument can be raised and it does not acknowledge a childless woman's ability to make a decision regarding surrogacy).
166. [d. at 1499.
167. [d.
168. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing S.B. 937 introduced
by Senator Watson, which attempts to include all potential third-party assisted
childbearing methods).
169. Johnson, at 1492.
170. See supra notes 95-128 and accompanying text.
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tral findings l7l that require analysis.
a. Parental Rights of the Parties

Judge Parslow determined that a surrogate carrying the genetic child of a couple does not acquire parental rights. 172 He
essentially established that genetic contribution should be given
priority over gestational contribution. 178 Until recent history, genetic connection was the sole means of determining natural biological parenthood. 174 That the gestational relationship in Johnson was not given legal recognition 1711 is therefore not surprising.
However, one can argue that the gestational carrier is also a
natural parent. 176 During pregnancy, there is a unique physiological relationship between the fetus and the gestational mother.177
171. First, that a surrogate carrying the genetic child of a couple does not acquire
parental rights; second, gestational surrogacy contracts are not void nor against public
policy and Anna Johnson relinquished her parental rights when she executed such a contract; and third, it is in the best interests of the child not to have three natural parents.
Johnson, at 1485-92.
172. Id. at 1485. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California, at 8-10, Johnson v. Calvert (Orange County Super. Ct., Decided
Oct. 22, 1990) (No. X633190) [hereinafter ACLU Brief) (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 258-62 (1983) for the proposition that in determining parental rights, biological
connection is not the exclusive factor). ACLU Brief, at 8.
173. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (the Court recognized that the private interest of a man in the children he has sired and raised warrants protection). Id. at
651. (Quoting Meyers v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), the court in Stanley stated
that the "rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed essential"). Id.
174. In some instances genetics is deemed not to establish parental rights. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7005(b} (West 1988) provides: "[T]he donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." See
ACLU Brief, supra note 172, at 8 & n.3.
175. Johnson, at 1485.
176. Shultz, Reproductiue Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 332 [hereinafter Intent-Based
ParenthoodJ(arguing that "[t]here is no persuasive basis for a categorical preference for
either a gestational contributor or a genetic contributor to receive exclusive recognition
as 'mother' "). See also Inalienable Rights, supra note 129, at 1951-52 (a gestational
carrier would have a strong claim as a biological mother); Annas, Redefining Parenthood
and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need New Laws, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Oct.
1984, at 50 (arguing that the legal presumption that the gestational mother is the legal
mother should remain, thus recognizing "the biological fact that the gestational mother
has contributed more of herself to the child than the genetic mother"). Id. at 51.
177. M. YOUNG, IMMUNOLOGY OF PREGNANCY AND ITS DISORDERS (1989). ("The environment of the fetus is a reflection of maternal health and nutrition.") Id. at 23. See M.
ADINOLFI, IMMUNOLOGY OF PREGNANCY AND ITs DISORDERS (1989). See also ACLU Brief,
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Nevertheless, Judge Parslow ruled that only a genetic connection warrants legal recognition in gestational surrogacy.178
b. Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts
Superior Court Judge Richard Parslow further found that
even if there were parental rights, they were previously relinquished by the gestational carrier pursuant to the surrogacy contract.179 He determined that gestational contracts in the in vitro
fertilization cases are neither void nor against public policy.180
He alluded to constitutional rights that would be infringed upon
if all surrogacy contracts were declared illegal. 181
Proponents of surrogacy assert that fundamental rights protected by both the federal Constitution and the California Constitution support the right to enter into surrogacy arrangements.
Most notably, the right of privacy is expressly guaranteed by the
California Constitution,182 and includes a right of procreative
choice. 183
Since the California Constitution expressly recognizes a
right to privacy, it is considered broader than the federal right
to privacy184 and has been interpreted as a document of independent force. m The United States Supreme Court and the Calsupra note 172, at 9.
178. Judge Parslow conceded that Anna Johnson had made a "substantial contribution" to the child, but her role as the gestational carrier was insufficient to warrant recognition as a natural parent. Johnson, at 1485.
179. [d. at 1487-88.
180. [d. at 1489.
181. [d. at 1493.
182. See supra note 38. The right to privacy is only implied by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. Committee to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779,
172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). ("The fundamental right at issue is the right to private procreative choice free from governmental interference.") [d. at 288, 625 P.2d at 801, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 888; People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969)
(first recognizing the Constitutional right of procreative choice in California); American
Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d 831, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1989).
184. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van De Kamp, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 839,263
Cal. Rptr. at 49.
185. [d. The court in American Academy of Pediatrics stated that "[tlhe California
Supreme Court recognized its authority 'to construe the California Constitution to provide protection beyond that afforded by parallel provisions of the federal document.' "
[d. at 841, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 50 (quoting People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal. 3d 822, 827, 640
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ifornia Supreme Court have repeatedly acknowledged a right of
privacy or liberty in matters related to marriage and family.186
Additionally, the fundamental right of parenting has been recognized by the California courts, and is only disturbed in extreme
cases of neglect or abandonment. 187
The constitutionally protected freedom of association 188 also
supports the right of persons to enter into surrogacy arrangements. The relationships entitled to this constitutional protection are those concerning the creation and sustenance of a family.189 Thus the fundamental right of intimate association has
been recognized by the Court as encompassing the right to make
procreative choices. 19o
These constitutionally recognized rights support the proposition that individuals should be free to enter into surrogacy
arrangements. Yet whether a surrogacy contract should be enforced or considered void as against public policy requires further analysis.

In upholding the surrogacy contract in Johnson,l9l Judge
Parslow emphasized that it contained a provision regarding relinquishment, and that the agreement was entered into before
the embryo was implanted. 192 He also pointed out that Anna
Johnson knew she had to give the child to the Calverts upon its
P.2d 753, 755, 180 Cal. Rptr. 617, 619 (1982}).
186. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 486, 500 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 963, 458 P. 2d
194, 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354, 359 (1969).
187. In re Carma leta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 489, 579 P. 2d 514, 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623,
627 (1978).
188. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-20 (1983). The Court
stated:
[T)he Court has concluded that choices to enter into and
maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role
of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom
that is central to our constitutional scheme. In this respect,
freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.
[d. at 617-18.
189. [d. at 619.
190. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'I, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (childbirth). See
ACLU Brief, supra note 172, at 5-6.
191. Johnson, at 1489.
192. [d.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol21/iss3/3

28

Lawrence: Surrogacy in California

1991]

SURROGACY IN CALIFORNIA

553

birth,193 and that this was in accord with the expectations of the
parties to the agreement. 194
At the time of signing the surrogacy agreement, all the parties to the contract intended that the Calverts would have exclusive custody of the child upon its birth. 1911 A custody determination based upon the intent of the parties l96 is one method of
both resolving disputes involving third-party assisted childbearing and of legislating surrogacy.197
Opponents of surrogacy contend that the state has a compelling interest against enforcement of commercial surrogacy
agreements. 19S Claims of commodification and exploitation arise.
Underlying the commodification argument is the fear that children and surrogate mothers will be viewed as a means to another's end. 199 Yet permitting the exchange of money in new reproductive arrangements does not automatically result in
commodifying both children and women. 200 Already donors in
other reproductive techniques, such as artificial insemination
and ovum donation, are compensated. To compensate a surrogate is an extension of the recognition for a donor's contribution.
Exploitation of women is another expressed fear of opponents of surrogacy. Yet one commmentator argues that exploitation of women is actually perpetuated when women are unable
to gain monetary recognition for things uniquely achieved by
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. at 1485.
Id. 1490.
Id. at 1489-90.
Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 176, at 323. ("Within the context of arti-

ficial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express
and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.")
197. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing recently introduced
legislation in California).
198. A number of commentators have addressed the negative ramifications of surrogacy. See SHANNON, supra note 17; Recht, "M" is for Money: Baby M and the Surrogate
Motherhood Controversy, 37 AM. V.L. REV. 1013, 1020-28 (1988).
199. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parenting, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Oct. 1983, at 35 (arguing that it is unethical to separate the decision to create
children from the desire to have them. By creating a child without desiring it may cause
children to be viewed as commodities or items of manufacture). Id. at 36-37.
200. See Intent-Based Parenthood, supra note 176, at 334-37. ("The critical issue is
not whether something involves monetary exchange as one of its aspects, but whether it
is treated as reducible solely to its monetary features.") Id. at 336.
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women. 201 Furthermore, monetary concerns only seem to surface
when women and children are involved. 202
Nevertheless, there are important concerns raised in compensating surrogates. One concern is that the decision to become
a surrogate may not in fact be voluntary. This potential arises
when a surrogate's choice becomes involuntary due to personal
circumstances of hardship, such that no choice actually exists.
However, these fears can be allayed if sufficient precautions are
undertaken.
Prior to entering into a surrogate agreement, a surrogate
should be determined to be financially stable and independently
represented by an attorney to ensure that her decision to be a
surrogate is voluntary. Professional counseling should be undergone by all the parties to a surrogacy agreement. A surrogate
also should be informed, orally and in writing, of her rights and
responsibilities as a surrogate, and should consent in writing evidencing her intent. By completing these procedures a substantial amount of time before undergoing any insemination or in
vitro procedures, the surrogate will have time to consider all of
the negative ramifications of entering into a surrogacy agreement. If all of the above precautions are taken, it is more likely
that a surrogate will be sufficiently informed to decide whether
or not to enter into a surrogacy arrangement. Basing custody decisions upon the intent of the parties alone, however, may prove
to be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
c.

Best Interests of the Child

Judge Parslow's decision awarding sole legal and physical
custody of the child to the Calverts was in part based upon a
determination of the best interests of the child. He believed
there were public policy problems with a child having three
parents. 203
In determining custody, the courts should consider more
than the intent of the parties. The best interests of the child
201. [d. at 336.
202. [d. at 337.
203. Johnson, at 1492.
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should also be addressed. 204 For an infant, it is manifestly important to ensure continuity in the child's life.2OII Continuity
should be used as a guideline by the courts.206
By taking into account the best interests of the child, the
adult's interests are consequently subordinated in favor of the
child's interests. However, since surrogacy arrangements do not
consider a child's best interests, it is imperative that in a custody dispute, courts address the best interests of the child. As in
the Johnson case, a guardian ad litem protects a child's best
interests contrasted to the interests asserted by the adults in a
surrogacy custody dispute.
In Johnson, the final decision by the trial court judge to
place the child with the Calverts, and to deny visitation rights to
Johnson, reflects a best interest determination for the child. The
decision to permit only one adult to act as the "psychological
mother" was an attempt to eliminate confusion and uncertainty
in the child's life. Despite the harsh consequences of such a decision on the surrogate in this case, the decision to award sole legal and physical custody to one set of parents was in the best
interests of the child.
CONCLUSION
As new reproductive technologies become available, laws
must be enacted to address them. Without legislation on the
204. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SOL NIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (2d ed. 1979)[hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS]. (Claiming that "[w]hile
they make the interests of a child paramount over all other claims when his physical
well-being is in jeopardy, they subordinate, often intentionally, his psychological wellbeing to ... an adult's right to assert a biological tie"). [d. at 4. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608
(West 1988) provides in relevant part: "In making a determination of the best interest of
the child . . . the court shall, among other factors it finds relevant, consider all of the
following: (a) The health, safety, and welfare of the child."
205. BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS. supra note 204, at 18, 32. ("When there are
changes of parent figure or other hurtful interruptions, the child's vulnerability and the
fragility of the relationship becomes evident.") [d. at 18. Change of the caretaking person
for infants also affects the course of their emotional development. [d. at 32.
206. [d. at 34. "The implications for this guideline for the laws on ... custody are
that each child placement be final and unconditional and that pending final placement a
child must not be shifted to accord with each tentative decision." [d. at 35. However, if
this continuity guideline is followed by the courts, the longer a child remains in an
adult's custody pending appeal, the less likely the court will allow the other party to
obtain custody. [d. at 46.
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subject, the judiciary is left to the task of interpreting current
statutory law. Most of these laws were not drafted with any consideration of surrogacy.
.
Additionally, the interests of surrogate mothers, infertile
couples and intermediaries must be weighed against societal
concerns. To address these potentially competing values, legislation regulating commercial surrogacy in California should be enacted. Regulations requiring intensive counseling and evaluations of prospective surrogates and parents will minimize
exploitation of those involved. Potential surrogates should be independently represented by counsel to ensure voluntary choice
and to eliminate the potential for conflict of interest. Licensing
of surrogate intermediaries will ensure adherence to uniform
standards throughout the whole process. Rather than criminalizing those involved in surrogate parenting agreements, regulation
of the practice will recognize individual procreative choice while
at the same time minimize any risks of exploitation or of driving
the practice underground.
While the intent of the parties in a surrogacy agreement
should be considered by the judiciary in establishing custody,
also employing a best interest determination will preserve society's fundamental value of putting the child's interests first,
rather than those of the adult parties.
POSTSCRIPT
On appeal the California Court of Appeal affirmed the ruling of the trial court in
Anna J. u. Mark C.I07 The court held that under the Uniform Parentage Actio. and the
Evidence Code,'o. the wife and husband were the natural mother and father of the child.
The court held that the question of maternity as determined under section 895 of
the Evidence Code confirms who is the "natural" mother of the child .... As the blood
tests excluded Anna from being the natural mother and because Anna had stipulated
that Crispina is genetically related to the child, the court found that the trial court's
determination that Crispina is the natural mother should be upheld.1Il
The court of appeal found that the designation of natural parent status to the genetic parents did not violate the gestational surrogate's due process and equal protection

207. 234 Cal. App. 3d 1557, 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1991). The case is now pending
before the California Supreme Court.
208. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7000 et seq. (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
209. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 621, 895 (West 1983 & Supp. 1991).
210. Anna J. v. Mark C., 234 Cal. App. at 1567, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
211. Id.
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rights .... The court also stated that it was not necessary to decide whether the contract
is enforceable in this case ....

212. Id. at 1572-76, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 378-81.
213. Id. at 1576-77, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
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